Real Estate Securitization and the Debt Maturity Structure: Evidence from J-REITs by Mamoru, Nagano
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Real Estate Securitization and the Debt
Maturity Structure: Evidence from
J-REITs
Nagano Mamoru
Nagoya City University
September 2009
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24675/
MPRA Paper No. 24675, posted 31. August 2010 04:16 UTC
1 
 
 
 
Real Estate Securitization and the Debt Maturity 
Structure: Evidence from J-REITs 
 
 
Mamoru Nagano1 
  
                                                        
1 Corresponding author, Professor, Nagoya City University, Yamanohata 1, Mizuho, Nagoya 467-8501 Japan, 
Tel/Fax : +81-52-872-5736, Email: mnagano@econ.nagoya-cu.ac.jp 
2 
 
Real Estate Securitization and the Debt Maturity Structure: Evidence from 
J-REITs 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between real estate asset liquidity and the liability 
structure of Japanese Real Estate Investment Trusts (J-REITs). It employs data on the regionality 
and usage of real estate assets as new proxies for the liquidation value of these assets, and arrives 
at the following conclusions. First, J-REITs with high ratios of real estate investment assets in 
highly liquid regions, that is, regions where the trade frequency per unit area is high, have high 
debt-to-equity ratios and debts of long-term maturity. Second, J-REITs with high concentration 
ratios of small real estate assets that are traded as residential properties also have high 
debt-to-equity ratios and debts of long-term maturity. In addition, the above relationships are 
enhanced when the REIT has a concentrated ownership structure. In summary, this paper 
validates the employment of the regional characteristics and usage type of real estate assets as 
proxies for asset liquidation value, and confirms that these proxies are related to the liability 
structure of J-REITs. This connection is possibly intensified by the perception of block shareholders 
as sponsor firms by market participants. 
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Introduction 
 
 Much of the recent empirical literature on real estate investment trusts (REITs) focuses 
on the determinants of capital structure. However, REIT sample data are better suited to an 
examination of theoretical hypotheses because REITs have only one type of asset, that is, real estate. 
Generally, firms are in a complex line of business and their fixed assets are owned for various 
types of production. REITs are one of a few industries with a simple asset structure, which is why 
recent literature has preferred to use them as a basis for empirical studies in this field. 
 The existing literature has discussed the determinants of capital structure for a long time. 
The trade-off and pecking order theories are two prominent theories of capital structure. The 
trade-off theory holds that capital structure is determined by the balance between the benefits and 
costs derived from a firm’s selected funding schemes. Conversely, the pecking order theory 
maintains that the cost of information imposed on corporate outsiders influences managerial 
choices regarding debt and capital. Capital structure also influences corporate fixed assets. 
Creditors wish to avoid risky investments when financial leverage is high, thus creating an 
underinvestment problem for the firm. 
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 Recent literature has pointed out that fixed asset investment and other investment 
activities are influenced not only by capital structure, but also by asset liquidity. For instance, it is 
said that underinvestment is mitigated when asset liquidity is high, even if financial leverage is 
also high. This is because creditors can liquidate a highly liquid asset should their borrower 
become insolvent, and means that, under conditions of high financial leverage, a firm with lower 
levels of asset liquidity must fund itself via short-term debt tools. In this regard, recent literature 
has focused on how asset liquidity influences capital structure and debt term structure. 
 In addition, preliminary interviews of REIT practitioners conducted by the author 
produced a common and consistent testimony: a concentrated ownership structure is a unique 
feature of Japanese REITs (J-REITs), and one that might strongly influence their liability structure. 
The literature on REITs also supports the proposition that the existence of blockholders promotes 
the convergence of shareholder interests and improves a firm’s corporate performance. Therefore, 
this paper employs a sample of data obtained from J-REITs in order to verify the above hypotheses 
concerning the relationships among asset liquidity, liability structure, and ownership 
concentration. In other words, it aims to contribute to the existing literature by ascertaining the 
influence of ownership concentration on liability structure and asset liquidity. 
 The next section reviews the literature on the relationship between the degree of asset 
liquidity in the debit side of the balance sheet and the structure of the credit side of the balance 
sheet. It also explains how this study contributes to the existing body of literature on REITs. The 
third section describes our hypothesis in the context of the literature and recent trends in the 
J-REIT market. The fourth section presents the data, while the fifth elucidates the study’s empirical 
methodology and results. The sixth and seventh sections discuss and draw conclusions from the 
results. 
 
2. Existing Literature 
 
 Real estate securitization is the process of issuing securities for commercial purposes. 
Generally, all firms face refinancing risks every time external borrowing repayments are due. The 
main purpose of real estate securitization is to increase a firm’s funding schemes and minimize its 
refinancing risks. Real estate securitization enables a firm to access funds depending not on its own 
creditworthiness, but on real estate value, which is independent of its creditworthiness. 
Consequently, REITs can collect a number of retail funds from individual investors in a financial 
market. 
 Many works have shown that a change in a firm’s asset liquidation value influences its 
capital structure. Fama and French (2002) organize theories relating to capital structure and 
categorize the determinants of capital structure according to trade-off theory and pecking order 
theory. As noted previously, trade-off theory suggests that corporate capital structure is 
determined by the balance between the costs and benefits of a firm’s funding schemes. Examples 
of the costs are a high probability of underinvestment and the cost of liquidation, while the benefits 
include mitigation of the free cash flow problem and decreasing tax expenditure. However, Myers 
(1977) and Hart (1993) suggest that the cost of information also influences the corporate capital 
structure, and that firms choose funding tools depending on the degree of information asymmetry 
these tools create. 
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 Based on these prominent writings, recent literature has focused on both financial 
leverage and the term structures of a firm’s liabilities. Barclay et al. (2003) emphasize that a firm is 
likely to face underinvestment when it is highly levered. This is because creditors do not want 
managers to invest aggressively when a firm is highly levered, even if the investment is expected 
to be highly profitable. In such cases, risk-adverse creditors may prevent professional managers 
from seeking out highly profitable investment projects. Williamson (1988) underlines the role of 
asset liquidity in the relationship between financial leverage and investment. In contrast to Barclay 
et al. (2003), he suggests that a firm with highly liquid assets is able to choose from various funding 
tools even if it is highly levered (Williamson 1988). In such cases, the cost of liquidation is low, even 
if the debtor becomes insolvent. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) support this argument and further 
propose the existence of a positive relationship between asset liquidation value and financial 
leverage. In addition, they find that an increase in asset liquidation value mitigates the 
principal-agent problem (Shleifer and Vishny 1992). 
 The theoretical approaches outlined above have also been applied to empirical studies. 
Benmelech (2005) uses a funding scheme for a nineteenth-century railroad project to examine the 
relationship between asset liquidity and financial leverage. Benmelech et al. (2005) employ 
commercial mortgage loan data to verify the relationship between residential mortgage loan 
maturities and zoning regulations. As well, studies increasingly exploit data from the REIT market 
to substantiate the theoretical frameworks submitted by Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992). For example, Brown and Riddiough (2003) and Giambona et al. (2008) employ 
REIT data to explore the relationships among asset liquidation value, the debt-to-equity ratio, and 
liability structure. 
 Existing studies on the relationship between asset liquidation value and liability 
structure focus on the estimation of asset liquidation value, for which there are three 
methodologies. Geltner and Miller (2001) equate the liquidation value of real estate assets with the 
lease contract period of REIT properties and evaluate the influence of this period on the liability 
structure of the firms to which the properties belong. They stress that, when asset liquidity is high, 
managers can improve the profitability of a property through renovation and other maintenance 
efforts by raising additional funds (Geltner and Miller 2001). Therefore, highly liquid REITs can 
safely engage in high levels of financial leverage (Geltner and Miller 2001). The second 
methodology estimates real estate asset value using data from the commercial mortgage-backed 
securities (CMBS) market, from which researchers can now directly obtain data on asset 
liquidation prices. Recent statistical development in this market has contributed to the further 
improvement of this methodology. 
The third approach calculates indicators of asset liquidation value using various types of 
quantitative and qualitative information on real estate assets. This information includes real estate 
prices, zoning regulations, and the probability of future liquidation. Since this methodology 
includes comprehensive qualitative information that others do not, the indicators are considered 
useful by researchers. This methodology was first developed by the Society of Industrial Realtors 
(SIOR) (1984) and the Urban Land Institute (ULI) (1982). In recent years, Benmelech et al. (2005) 
have incorporated in this methodology information regarding zoning regulations, while 
Giambona et al. (2008) have considered the possibility of liquidation and the term structure of the 
rental and lease agreements. 
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 Our views on the methodologies for the definition and calculation of asset liquidation 
value are as follows. The first methodology, which uses the term structure of lease maturity as a 
proxy for asset liquidation value, is very objective. However, the term of the lease or rental contract 
is often determined by the individual lessor or tenant, so the value thus yielded, though objective, 
may not always represent universal market liquidity. The second methodology, which uses CMBS 
market data to estimate asset liquidation value, is frequently used by the media and credit rating 
agencies such as Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s Investors Service, but not by academia. 
The reason for this is that only a limited number of real estate assets are transacted in the CMBS 
market, and illiquid real estate is not traded at all; therefore, the data could contain sample biases. 
The third methodology makes use of very comprehensive information on real estate assets, but the 
indicators it uses may be arbitrary. 
 
3. Hypothesis 
 
 The previous sections attest to the abundance of literature concerning the capital 
structure and liability structure of REITs. Against this backdrop, this paper employs a new 
methodology for estimating real estate asset liquidation value and examines the relationship 
between this value and liability structure. In addition, this paper also dissects the ownership 
structure of J-REITs. The existence of blockholders is one of the unique characteristics of J-REITs 
and has evolved with the development of the J-REIT market. However, market participants 
believe that a concentrated ownership structure influences liability structure. 
 First, we regard the concentration and dispersion of real estate investment assets as 
important factors of liquidation value. We hypothesize that J-REITs with a low concentration ratio 
of the five largest real estate assets, as calculated in terms of face value, generally have high 
liquidation values. Accordingly, they find it easier to convert some of the real estate assets to cash 
compared to J-REITs with a few big real estate assets. Second, based on a series of discussions by 
Barclay et al. (2003), Williamson (1988), and Shleifer and Vishny (1992), we hypothesize that a 
firm’s real estate asset regionality and use of REIT also influence its debt-to-equity ratio and the 
term structure of its liabilities. In other words, our hypothesis is that REIT creditors who monitor 
the repayment capability of their debtors allow REIT managers to maintain a high debt-to-equity 
ratio when the REIT’s assets are concentrated in a highly liquid region. We employ the new 
proxies for asset liquidation value (regional characteristics and usage type), and examine the 
influence of these on liability structure. Benmelech et al. (2005) regard zoning regulations as an 
element of real estate asset liquidity. We included qualitative information of zoning regulations in 
our regional and usage concentration data. Since the Tokyo metropolitan area has a high real 
estate transaction frequency per unit area, we assume that a concentration of real estate assets in 
this region enables a REIT to hold a high debt-to-equity ratio and liabilities of long maturity. 
 Third, we hypothesize that ownership concentration influences liability structure and 
liquidation value. Pound (1988), Brickley et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Palia and 
Lichtenberg (1999) contend that the existence of blockholders improves a firm’s managerial 
discipline because it mitigates the divergence of interests among the firm’s shareholders. We 
assume that market participants regard blockholders of J-REITs, in particular, as de facto sponsors 
and providers of financial assistance should the REIT become insolvent. This is because Japanese 
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real estate industries and trust banks collaborated in the development of the REIT industry in its 
earliest days, at the request of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT). 
Most market participants recognize this historical process and understand that some REITs are 
strongly supported by their parent companies. 
 Our study considers the relationship between liability structure and ownership 
concentration, which the literature discussed in the previous section does not do. Our hypothesis is 
that REITs with high asset liquidation values and concentrated ownership structures are allowed 
to have debts of long maturity. 
 
4. Data 
 
 This paper uses REIT financial statements and ownership data from Thomson Reuters. 
The real estate investment asset values of each REIT, categorized by region and usage type, and 
the total value of each REIT’s top five investment assets are taken from the Japanese Annual 
Securities Financial Report. The data cover the period of 2003 to 2008. Data on real estate asset 
regionality is available from the Japanese Ministry of Finance, which supervises the Japanese 
Annual Securities Financial Report and requests that all REITs disclose complete information on 
each individual property. However, since regional classification sometimes differs from REIT to 
REIT, we re-categorized and re-aggregated the data according to the following categories: (1) the 
23 wards of Tokyo, (2) the Tokyo metropolitan area, excluding the 23 wards of Tokyo plus 
neighboring prefectures, and (3) other local cities. The 41 REITs in the report share common 
classifications for the usage type of their real estate assets. Therefore, we used this data in its 
original form to calculate the REITs’ purpose of use concentration ratios for (1) residential 
buildings, (2) office buildings, (3) commercial facilities, and (4) hotels and others. In addition, we 
used the REIT ownership data from Thomson Reuters to calculate the REITs’ top five ownership 
ratios and foreign ownership ratios as proxies for ownership concentration. 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
 
5.1 Asset Concentration and Liability Structure 
 
 This section examines the relationship between the concentration of real estate 
investment assets and the liability structure of J-REITs. We used the concentration of the top five 
real estate assets as a proxy for the inverse value of asset liquidation. The data suggests that some 
J-REITs own a limited number of real estate properties, that is, a few big properties, while others 
own many small properties. The former group has a high ratio of the concentration of the top five 
real estate assets and the latter has a low ratio for the same. Our hypothesis is that J-REITs with 
many small properties are allowed to sustain higher debt-to-equity ratios and liabilities of longer 
maturity than are J-REITs with a few big properties. This hypothesis assumes that debtors can 
request managers to either liquidate the firm’s assets or reallocate their existing portfolio because 
the firm’s real estate assets are traded in small lots when its asset concentration ratio is low. 
Prominent works by Barclay et al. (2003) and Williamson (1988) assert that a firm with a high 
debt-to-equity ratio is likely to face an underinvestment problem. This assumes that creditors will 
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adjure managers to make risk-adverse investments. To examine the above hypothesis, we 
employed the following equation model: 
 
 
εφφφ ++++= OwnershipionConcentratDERconstShortDebt 321   
(5. 1)
 
 
114131211 ζθθθθ +++++= FirmSizeMBRROAShortDebtconstDER  
(5. 2) 
 
ShortDebt: Outstanding Short-term Borrowing divided by Total Liability (current year), DER: Total Liability 
divided by Market Value of Capital (current year), Concentration: Top Five Investment Asset Concentration 
divided by Total Investment Assets (previous year), Ownership: Top Five Ownership Ratio (previous year), 
ROA: Return on Total Assets (previous year), MBR: Total Liability plus Market Value of Capital divided by 
Book Value of Total Assets (previous year), Firm Size: Natural Logarithm of Total Assets (previous year). 
 
 This analysis employed two-stage least squares estimations within a simultaneous 
equation system. In this model, top five asset concentration was an instrumental variable, and 
short-term debt divided by total liability and the debt-to-equity ratio were endogenous variables. 
The Hausman specification test showed that the fixed effects model should be used, and The 
following conclusions were derived from its estimations. First, our results indicate that REITs with 
high debt-to-equity ratios are statistically dependent on short-term borrowing. Second, parameter 
of top five concentration is significantly positive in model (a) (See Table 1). In other words, REITs 
with many small properties can obtain finance through long-term borrowing. This is consistent 
with our hypothesis that the dispersion of real estate assets contributes to an increase in long-term 
liabilities. 
 
Table 1 Empirical Result 1: Real Estate Asset Concentration and Liability Structure 
 
Note 1: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Note 2: Dum04—Dum07 are year dummy variables. 
(a) Dep. Var .= ShortDebt (b) Dep. Var. = DER
Endogenous Variables
  ShortDebt 1.320 (0.640)
  DER 0.046 ** (2.020)
Instrument Variables
  ROA -0.819 *** (-6.650)
  FirmSize 0.875 *** (3.970)
  MBR 1.844 *** (3.670)
  Concentration 0.001 ** (2.200)
  Ownership -0.004 *** (-2.770)
  Dum04 0.135 (0.560) -1.727 (-0.340)
  Dum05 0.122 (0.640) -1.908 (-0.460)
  Dum06 0.111 (0.550) -0.826 (-0.280)
  Dum07 0.119 (0.580) -0.932 (-0.450)
Const -4.668 (-0.520) 13.835 (0.340)
F Statistic 2.420 *** 2.440 ***
Hausman Specification Test 20.420 * 22.520 **
Observations 111 111
Firms 38 38
Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model
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Note 3: Sample includes bankrupt REITs. 
 
5. 2 Regional Concentration as Asset Liquidation Value 
 
 Our second hypothesis pertains to the relationship between regional concentration of 
real estate investment assets and liability structure. According to the White Paper on Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport in Japan (2007), 1.6 million real estate transactions were performed in 
2005, and Tokyo accounts for more than 30 percent of this total. In addition, the average size of 
area traded was 4,600 square meters, while in Tokyo it was one-fifteenth of the all-Japan average. 
In other words, 42.7 deals were closed per square meter in Tokyo. This is four times the number of 
deals per hectare averaged by Japan. Intuitively, these statistics suggest a high asset liquidation 
value for real estate in the Tokyo metropolitan area. This section examines the relationship 
between regional concentration of real estate investment assets and the term structure of liabilities. 
Here, we regard regional investment concentration as a proxy for asset liquidation value; that is to 
say, asset concentration in Tokyo metropolitan area is high when asset liquidation value is high. 
To verify the relationship between the variable of regional investment concentration and liability 
structure, the following empirical equation model was employed: 
 
vOwnershipAREAOwnershipAREA
OwnershipAREADERconstLongDebt
++++
+++=
2
6
2
54
321
)()(* ααα
ααα
    (5. 3) 
224232221 ζθθθθ +++++= FirmSizeMBRROALongDebtconstDER       (5. 4)
 
  
 
LongDebt: Long-term Debt divided by Total Liability (current year),DER: Total Liability divided by Market 
Value of Capital (current year), AREA- 1) Tokyo23: Real Estate Assets Owned in the 23 Wards of Tokyo divided 
by Total Investment Assets (previous year), AREA- 2) MetroArea: Real Estate Assets Owned in the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Area excluding the 23 Wards of Tokyo plus Neighboring Prefectures divided by Total 
Investment Assets (previous year), AREA- 3) Local City: Real Estate Assets Owned in Local Cities other than 
those in Tokyo23 and MetroArea divided by Total Investment Assets (previous year), Ownership: Top Five 
Ownership Ratio (previous year), ROA: One-year Lagged Return on Total Assets (previous year),MBR: Total 
Liability plus Market Value of Capital divided by Book Value of Total Assets (previous year), FirmSize: Natural 
Logarithm of Total Assets (previous year). 
 
 We also employed two-stage least squares estimations for the simultaneous equation 
system for this eimprical model. Hausman specification statistics suggested that model (c) (see 
Table 2), but not models (a) and (b), should be estimated by the fixed effects model. The 
Breusch-Pagan test cannot be used on a simultaneous equation system employing the two-stage 
least squares estimation method. Therefore, Table 2reports the results of the error component for 
the two-stage least squares estimations of the random effects model. The results of another 
possible methodology, ordinary least squares (OLS) pooling estimates, are shown in Appendix 1. 
We employed both long-term borrowing and short-term borrowing divided by total liability as 
dependent variables, but report the former because it produces better overall results. The results 
are as follows: 
 The results of the random effects models (a) and (b) suggest that the parameters of 
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Tokyo23 and MetroArea are significant. In particular, the intersected variables between regional 
concentration and ownership for model (b) are significantly positive. This means that REITs with a 
high investment ratio in the 23 wards of Tokyo or the Tokyo metropolitan area, excluding the 23 
wards of Tokyo plus neighboring prefectures, possess long-term liabilities. The existence of a 
blockholder also prolongs debt term structure ofREITs that owns high ratio of real estate assets in 
the Tokyo metropolitan area excluding the 23 wards of Tokyo plus neighboring prefectures. 
Conversely, the parameter of Local City and the intersected variable with ownership for model (c) 
are insignificant. This means that investment concentration in local cities is not related to liability 
structure. 
 
Table 2. Empirical Result 2:  Regional Asset Concentration and Liability Structure 
 
 
(a) Dep. Var. = LongDebt (b) Dep. Var. = LongDebt (c) Dep. Var. = LongDebt
Endogenous Variable
 DER -0.015 *** (-4.320) -0.016 *** (-4.280) -0.015 *** (-4.350)
Instrument Variables
 Tokyo23 0.178 ** (2.330)
 MetroArea 0.012 ** (2.070)
 LocalCity -0.410 (-0.880)
 Ownership 0.112 * (1.800) 0.110 * (1.810) 0.111 * (1.810)
 Ownership*Tokyo23 0.222 (0.710)
 Ownership*MetroArea 0.307 *** (2.660)
 Ownership*LocalCity 1.744 (0.370)
 {Tokyo23}^2 0.112 (0.470)
 {MetroArea}^2 0.044 (0.810)
 {LocalCity}^2 0.100 (0.740)
 {Ownership}^2 -0.322 (-0.770) -0.321 (-0.870) -0.344 (-0.910)
Dum04 0.085 (0.980) 0.069 (0.920) 0.067 (0.970)
Dum05 0.026 (0.860) 0.018 (0.740) 0.017 (0.720)
Dum06 0.033 (0.780) 0.046 (0.760) 0.034 (0.920)
Dum07 0.041 (0.970) 0.042 (0.960) -0.047 (0.910)
Const -1.026 (-1.420) -0.916 (-1.060) -0.897 (-1.040)
F Statistic 7.510 ***
Hausman Specification Test 15.260 16.020 35.960 ***
Observations 119 119 119
Firms 38 38 38
(a)' Dep. Var. = DER (b)' Dep. Var. = DER (c)' Dep. Var. = DER
Endogenous Variable
 LongDebt -2.111 (-0.410) -2.111 (-0.410) -2.111 (-0.410)
Instrument Variables
 ROA -0.774 *** (-5.450) -0.774 *** (-5.450) -0.774 *** (-5.450)
 FirmSize 0.747 *** (3.440) 0.747 *** (3.440) 0.747 *** (3.440)
 MBR 1.119 *** (3.970) 1.119 *** (3.970) 1.119 *** (3.970)
Dum04 -0.004 (-0.050) -0.004 (-0.050) -0.004 (-0.050)
Dum05 -0.019 (-0.370) -0.019 (-0.370) -0.019 (-0.370)
Dum06 0.041 (0.610) 0.041 (0.610) 0.041 (0.610)
Dum07 0.029 (0.790) 0.029 (0.790) 0.029 (0.790)
Const 0.176 (0.490) 0.176 (0.490) 0.176 (0.490)
F Statistic 5.420 *** 5.110 *** 5.420 ***
Hausman Specification Test 39.210 *** 39.210 *** 39.210 ***
Observations 119 119 119
Firms 38 38 38
Random Effects Model Random Effects Model Fixed Effects Model
Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model
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Note 1: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Note 2: Dum04—Dum07 are year dummy variables. 
Note 3: Sample includes bankrupt REITs. 
 
5.3 Usage of Real Estate Assets as a Proxy for Asset Liquidation Value 
 
 This section focuses on the relationship between a REIT’s usage of its real estate assets 
and its liability structure. Giambona et al. (2008) note that the liquidation value of real estate assets 
differs according to the assets’ intended use. They place real estate assets into four categories: 
industrial usage, apartments, hotels, and offices, in descending order of asset liquidation value 
(Giambona et al. 2008). Although the Japanese Annual Securities Financial Report uses different 
categories from those of Giambona et al. (2008), the following categories are common to both: 
residential real estate, offices, commercial usage, and hotels. Accordingly, this paper employed 
these categories to examine the relationship between the investment ratios for the foregoing types 
of usage and liability structure, allowing for the influence of ownership structure. 
 
 σβββ
βββ
+++
++++=
2
6
2
54
321
)()(* OwnershipTypeOwnershipType
OwnershipTypeDERconstLongDebt
  (5. 5) 
 334333231 ζθθθθ +++++= FirmSizeMBRROALongDebtconstDER  (5. 6)
 
 
 
LongDebt: Long-term Debt divided by Total Liability (current year), DER: Total Liability divided by Market 
Value of Capital (current year), Type-Residence: Real Estate Assets Used as Retail Residences divided by Total 
Investment Assets (previous year), Office: Real Estate Assets Used as Office Buildings divided by Total 
Investment Assets (previous year), Hotel: Real Estate Assets Used as Hotels divided by Total Investment Assets 
(previous year), Commerce: Real Estate Assets Used as Commercial Facilities divided by Total Investment 
Assets (previous year), Ownership: Top Five Ownership Ratio (previous year), ROA: Return on Total Assets 
(previous year),MBR: Total Liability plus Market Value of Capital divided by Book Value of Total Assets 
(previous year), FirmSize: Natural Logarithm of Total Assets (previous year). 
 
 The estimations produce the following results. As in previous sections, we used fixed 
effects estimation in our model and gauged the appropriateness of the methodology by looking at 
the results of the Hausman specification test. The statistics suggested that we should employ fixed 
effects estimation in models (a) to (d). The results of the fixed effect model show that the parameter 
of the residential usage ratio was significantly positive and also that the parameter was significant 
when the variable was intersected with ownership concentration. This means that REITs investing 
in residential properties are able to procure finance by taking on long-term debts. In contrast, the 
parameters of the office and commercial usage ratios are insignificant. The parameters of these 
variables are also insignificant when intersected by ownership concentration. Lastly, the parameter 
of the hotel ratio is also insignificant. 
 
Table 3.  Empirical Result 3: Asset Concentration by Usage and Liability Structure 
11 
 
 
Note 1: ***,** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Note 2: Dum04—Dum07 are year dummy variables. 
Note 3: Sample includes bankrupt REITs. 
 
5.4 Liability Structure and Ownership Concentration 
 
 Sections 5.2 and 5.3 have focused on the relationship between the new proxies for asset 
liquidation value and liability structure. This section elaborates on the influence of ownership 
concentration in order to enhance our understanding of the liability structure of J-REITs. Pound 
(1988) and Palia and Lichtenberg (1999) assert that the existence of a blockholder mitigates the 
divergence of interests among shareholders and strengthens managerial discipline. We 
hypothesize that high levels of ownership concentration by real estate businesses with a high asset 
liquidation value influences the business’s liability structure. In other words, we assume that 
(a) Dep. Var .= LongDebt (b) Dep. Var. = LongDebt (c) Dep. Var. = LongDebt (d) Dep. Var. = LongDebt
Endogenous Variable
 DER -0.011 *** (-4.410) -0.010 *** (-4.980) -0.014 *** (-4.810) -0.012 *** (-5.010)
Instrument Variables
 Residence 0.001 * (1.790)
 Office -0.248 (-0.360)
 Hotel 4.758 (0.720)
 Commerce -0.001 (-0.030)
 Ownership 0.101 * (1.880) 0.126 * (1.710) 0.111 * (1.900) 0.140 * (1.810)
 Ownership*Residence 0.270 *** (2.640)
 Ownership*Office -0.311 (-0.910)
 Ownership*Hotel 0.010 (1.100)
 Ownership*Commerce -0.519 (-1.100)
 {Residence}^2 -0.223 (-0.360)
 {Office}^2 0.154 (0.220)
 {Hotel}^2 -0.040 (-0.140)
 {Commerce}^2 -0.570 (-0.580)
 {Ownership}^2 -0.444 (-0.270) -0.764 (-0.330) -0.649 (-0.410) -0.991 (-0.640)
 Dum04 0.061 (0.630) 0.065 (0.740) 0.086 (0.990) 0.063 (0.650)
 Dum05 0.009 (0.140) 0.013 (0.210) 0.020 (0.350) 0.009 (0.150)
 Dum06 0.047 (0.840) 0.056 (0.940) 0.064 (0.550) 0.077 (0.640)
 Dum07 0.015 (0.960) 0.042 (0.950) 0.030 (0.700) 0.042 (0.960)
 Const -0.919 ** (-1.960) -0.921 (-1.070) -1.028 (-1.210) -0.922 (-1.060)
F Statistic 6.700 *** 6.220 *** 7.200 *** 7.440 ***
Hausman Specification Test 30.280 *** 39.160 *** 39.390 *** 38.960 ***
Observations 119 119 119 119
Firms 38 38 38 38
(a) Dep. Var. = DER (b) Dep. Var. = DER (c) Dep. Var. = DER (d) Dep. Var. = DER
Endogenous Variable
 LongDebt -2.111 (-0.410) -2.111 (-0.410) -2.111 (-0.410) -2.111 (-0.410)
Instrument Variables
 ROA -0.774 *** (-5.450) -0.774 *** (-5.450) -0.774 *** (-5.450) -0.774 *** (-5.450)
 FirmSize 0.747 *** (3.440) 0.747 *** (3.440) 0.747 *** (3.440) 0.747 *** (3.440)
 MBR 1.119 *** (3.970) 1.119 *** (3.970) 1.119 *** (3.970) 1.119 *** (3.970)
Dum04 -0.004 (-0.050) -0.004 (-0.050) -0.004 (-0.050) -0.004 (-0.050)
Dum05 -0.019 (-0.370) -0.019 (-0.370) -0.019 (-0.370) -0.019 (-0.370)
Dum06 0.041 (0.610) 0.041 (0.610) 0.041 (0.610) 0.041 (0.610)
Dum07 0.029 (0.790) 0.029 (0.790) 0.029 (0.790) 0.029 (0.790)
Const 0.176 (0.490) 0.176 (0.490) 0.176 (0.490) 0.176 (0.490)
F Statistic 5.420 *** 5.420 *** 5.420 *** 5.420 ***
Hausman Specification Test 39.210 *** 39.210 *** 39.210 *** 39.210 ***
Observations 119 119 119 119
Firms 38 38 38 38
Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model
Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model
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foreign investors and other parent companies that hold a large amount of a J-REIT’s shares do not 
base their investment decisions on the liability structure of the J-REIT. This is for three reasons: first, 
the converged interests of a small number of J-REIT shareholders enable them to request the 
J-REIT managers to reallocate their property asset portfolios. Second, the real estate businesses that 
own J-REIT blocks have expertise in real estate asset allocation and can act as suppliers of such 
assets. Third, external investors may regard the creditworthiness of a REIT as being virtually 
guaranteed by the real estate businesses that own it when one of these is a blockholder. 
 
 
ηχχχ
χχ
++++
+++=
3_2_1_
)(
765
21
OwnershipOwnershipOwnership
orTypeAREADERconstLongDebt
 (5. 7) 
 444434241 ζθθθθ +++++= FirmSizeMBRROALongDebtconstDER  (5. 8)
 
 
LongDebt: Long-term Debt divided by Total Liability (current year), DER: Total Liability divided by Market 
Value of Capital (current year), AREA- MetroArea: Real Estate Assets Owned in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area 
excluding the 23 Wards of Tokyo plus Neighboring Prefectures divided by Total Investment Assets (previous 
year), Type-Residence: Real Estate Assets Used as Retail Residences divided by Total Investment Assets 
(previous year), Ownership 1: Ownership Ratio of the Top Real Estate Firm (previous year), Ownership 2: 
Ownership Ratio of the Top Financial Institution (previous year), Ownership 3: Ownership Ratio of the Top 
Foreigner (previous year), ROA: Return on Total Assets (previous year),MBR: Total Liability plus Market 
Value of Capital divided by Book Value of Total Assets (previous year), FirmSize: Natural Logarithm of Total 
Assets (previous year). 
 
 Two variables were employed in the analysis of the data. These were the ratio of 
investment in the Tokyo metropolitan area, excluding the 23 wards of Tokyo plus neighboring 
prefectures, and the ratio of investment in residential real estate property as proxies for asset 
liquidation value. Three types of ownership data were obtained from Thomson Reuters. The first 
was the largest ownership ratio of real estate businesses to the total stock issued. The second was 
the largest ownership ratio of financial institutions to the total stock issued. The third was the ratio 
of foreign ownership concentration to the total stock issued. Hausman specification tests 
recommended the employment of the fixed effects model for both (a) and (b) (see Table 4). The 
following results are obtained from the preceding analysis. 
 First, the relationship between ownership concentration by real estate businesses and 
long-term debt as a proportion of total liability is positively significant. Conversely, the parameters 
of ownership concentration by financial institutions and foreigners are both insignificant. 
 
Table 4. Empirical Result 4: Ownership Concentration and Liability Structure 
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Note 1: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Note 2: Dum04—Dum07 are year dummy variables. 
Note 3: Sample includes bankrupt REITs. 
 
6. Liability Structure and Ownership Concentration: An International Comparison 
 
 This study tries to determine whether the results for the relationship between 
ownership structure and liability term structure also apply to other REIT markets. This section 
employs financial data on individual REITs from the United States of America (US), Canada, 
Australia, and Singapore, which are the world’s four largest REIT markets. While there were 
41listed REITs in Japan at the end of December 2008, there were 151 in the US, 31 in Canada, 69 in 
(a) Dep. Var. = LongDebt (b) Dep. Var. = LongDebt
Endogenous Variable
 DER -0.011 *** (-4.520) -0.011 *** (-5.000)
Instrument Variables
 MetroArea 0.169 ** (2.220)
 Residence 0.004 ** (2.100)
 Ownership by Real Estate 0.992 *** (4.200) 0.989 *** (3.020)
 Ownership by Financial Institutions -0.141 (-0.840) -0.090 (-1.100)
 Ownership by Foreigners 0.400 (0.810) 0.745 (0.410)
Dum04 -0.170 (-1.280) -0.185 (-1.430)
Dum05 -0.291 (-0.710) -0.293 (-0.720)
Dum06 -0.371 (-0.760) -0.375 (-0.780)
Dum07 -0.125 (-0.780) -0.128 (-0.820)
Const 0.634 (0.780) 0.649 (0.790)
F Statistic 8.820 *** 8.550 ***
Hausman Specification Test 31.860 *** 32.040 ***
Observations 99 99
Firms 32 32
(a) Dep. Var. = DER (b) Dep. Var. = DER
Endogenous Variable
 LongDebt -1.722 (-1.000) -1.722 (-1.000)
Instrument Variables
 ROA -0.661 *** (-3.450) -0.661 *** (-3.450)
 FirmSize 0.574 *** (2.940) 0.574 *** (2.940)
 MBR 1.226 *** (2.990) 1.226 *** (2.990)
Dum04 -0.239 (-1.240) -0.239 (-1.240)
Dum05 -0.322 (-1.450) -0.322 (-1.450)
Dum06 -0.390 (-0.980) -0.390 (-0.980)
Dum07 -0.135 (-0.820) -0.135 (-0.820)
Const 0.256 (0.320) 0.256 (0.320)
F Statistic 9.100 *** 9.100 ***
Hausman Specification Test 39.780 *** 39.780 ***
Observations 99 99
Firms 32 32
Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model
Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model
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Australia, and 20 in Singapore. Of course, the larger the sample of countries the better the 
comparison of international results. Although the REIT markets in the United Kingdom (UK), 
Malaysia, and Hong Kong are relatively large, the number of listed trust funds in these countries 
came to less than 20. Therefore, we excluded these three jurisdictions and incorporated the 
aforementioned markets in addition to Japan. 
 As with the analyses in other sections, we obtained both financial and ownership data 
from Thomson Reuters. The simultaneous equations are as follows: 
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 554535251 ζθθθθ +++++= FirmSizeMBRROAShortDebtconstDER   (5. 10)
 
 
ShortDebt: Short-term Debt divided by Total Liability (current year), DER: Total Liability divided by Market 
Value of Capital (current year), Ownership: Top Five Shareholder Ownership Concentrations (previous year), 
ROA: Return on Total Assets (previous year),MBR: Total Liability plus Market Value of Capital divided by 
Book Value of Total Assets (previous year), FirmSize: Natural Logarithm of Total Assets (previous year). 
 
 For Japan, Canada, and Australia, fixed effects models were employed because the 
Hausman specification tests for these were significant. For the US and Singapore, Table 5 shows 
the results of random effects estimation; the OLS pooling results for these two countries are 
indicated in Appendix 2. The results suggest that the parameter of the top five ownership 
concentrations are significantly negative in Japan, the US, Canada, and Singapore. Australia is the 
only exception. While this paper has assumed that ownership concentration in the REIT market is 
a unique characteristic of J-REITs, these results suggest that it also influences liability term 
structure in other major REIT markets. 
 
Table 5.  Empirical Result 5:  Liability Term Structure and Ownership Concentration 
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Note 1: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Note 2: Dum01—Dum07 are year dummy variables. 
Note 3: Sample includes bankrupt REITs. 
 
7. Discussion 
 
 This section discusses the implications derived from the preceding sections. First, based 
on the results of section 5.2 and 5.3, we conclude that the proxies of regional characteristics and 
usage type for asset liquidation value are appropriate. Historically, as shown by the MLIT, Tokyo 
(including the 23 wards and other districts) has had the highest frequency of real estate 
transactions per unit area. There is no doubt that real estate assets in this area have been easy to 
convert to cash when needed. Another important inference is that small assets can easily be 
converted to cash. Real estate assets belonging to J-REITs in Tokyo’s 23 wards are mostly office 
buildings and commercial facilities. It is more difficult to liquidate these large assets than it is to 
liquidate small residential properties. Small REITs cannot hold a complex of office buildings, but 
can hold a number of residential apartments. Our analysis confirms the significance of the positive 
relationships among the ratio of investment in the Tokyo metropolitan area (excluding the 23 
wards of Tokyo plus neighboring prefectures), residential property assets, and liability maturity. 
(a) Japan (b) United States (c) Canada (d) Australia (e) Singapore
Endogenous Variable
 DER 0.044 ** (2.020) 0.120 *** (4.950) 0.332 *** (3.680) 0.441 *** (2.940) 0.110 *** (4.550)
Instrument Variables
  MBR 1.022 (0.440) -0.116 (-0.310) 0.043 (0.440) 0.026 (0.170) -0.556 * (-2.000)
  Ownership -0.006 ** (-2.360) -9.977 *** (-3.390) -0.418 * (-1.770) 0.432 (0.320) -1.719 * (1.990)
  Ownership*MBR 0.908 (0.710) 0.034 (0.670) -0.064 * (-1.930) -1.166 (-0.950) -0.417 (-0.460)
  Ownership^2 -0.152 (-0.490) 4.499 (1.450) -0.406 (-1.560) 1.365 * (1.900) -1.153 (-1.080)
  MBR^2 0.024 (0.260) 0.010 * (1.850) 0.037 (1.470) -1.036 * (-1.680) 0.020 (0.140)
 Dum01 1.158 * (1.880) -0.216 ** (-2.400) 0.862 *** (3.810) -0.144 (-0.100)
 Dum02 -1.017 * (-1.740) 0.103 (1.610) 0.309 (1.400) -0.230 (-0.840)
 Dum03 -0.931 (-1.630) 0.021 (0.340) 0.041 (0.200) -0.470 (-0.930)
 Dum04 0.119 (0.440) -0.842 (-1.560) -0.012 (-0.220) 0.095 (0.049) -0.147 (-0.660)
 Dum05 0.141 (0.540) -0.643 (-1.280) -0.033 (-0.650) 0.123 (0.680) -0.075 (-0.370)
 Dum06 0.159 (0.520) -0.399 (-0.850) -0.061 (-1.260) 0.154 (1.020) -0.105 (-0.540)
 Dum07 0.146 (0.510) -0.223 (-0.500) -0.068 (-1.630) 0.069 (0.570) -0.030 (-0.200)
 Const -4.298 (-0.700) 4.771 * (2.020) 0.224 (1.340) -2.874 ** (-2.540) 2.372 * (1.860)
F Statistic 2.320 *** 1.740 * 1.460 *
Hausman Specification Test 30.750 *** 56.650 *** 57.730 ***
Observations 120 923 89 134 42
Firms 41 149 18 34 16
(a) Japan (b) United States (c) Canada (d) Australia (e) Singapore
Endogenous Variable
  ShortDebt 0.920 (1.020) -0.011 (-0.520) -0.040 (-0.120) 0.711 (0.890) 1.810 (0.710)
Instrument Variables
  ROA -0.818 *** (-4.650) -0.295 ** (-2.280) -0.252 ** (-2.080) 1.726 ** (2.470) 0.125 (0.690)
  FirmSize 0.628 *** (2.780) -0.085 (-0.320) 0.638 (0.470) 1.454 (1.550) 1.081 (1.040)
  MBR 1.636 *** (2.860) -0.171 (-0.550) 0.004 (0.210) 0.023 (0.270) -0.378 * (-2.130)
 Dum01 1.873 *** (3.670) -0.086 (-1.030) 0.436 *** (2.770) -0.110 (-0.550)
 Dum02 -0.413 (-0.830) 0.122 * (1.910) -0.024 (-0.150) -0.021 (-0.460)
 Dum03 -0.398 (-0.810) 0.059 (1.080) -0.216 (-1.330) -0.300 (-0.140)
 Dum04 -1.735 (-0.440) -0.372 (-0.720) 0.021 (0.440) -0.139 (-0.890) -0.082 (-0.370)
 Dum05 -1.834 (-0.340) -0.283 (-0.620) -0.010 (-0.200) -0.068 (-0.460) -0.054 (-0.280)
 Dum06 -0.867 (-0.180) -0.170 (-0.380) -0.045 (-1.000) 0.005 (0.040) 0.026 (0.160)
 Dum07 -0.968 (-0.510) -0.088 (-0.200) -0.042 (-1.000) -0.044 (-0.380) 0.081 (0.660)
 Const 13.537 (0.410) 2.518 *** (3.330) 0.121 (1.340) -0.377 (-0.580) 0.815 (1.510)
F Statistic 1.920 *** 1.740 * 1.460 *
Hausman Specification Test 30.450 *** 56.650 *** 57.730 ***
Observations 120 923 89 134 42
Firms 41 149 18 34 16
Random Effects Model
Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model
Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects ModelRandom Effects Model
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 At the beginning of this study, we found the Japanese Annual Securities Financial 
Report had not disclosed enough information about the trust contract period of real estate 
properties. Therefore, we could not employ the same proxies as those used in other studies. 
However, we also found that the proxies these studies used for the trust contract period were not 
always appropriate estimates of asset liquidation value. For instance, traditional business practices 
and the existence of individual factors between lessor and lessee can also influence the trust 
contract period thereby making these proxies unreliable. In contrast, the regional investment 
ratio and usage of assets are suitable proxies for asset liquidation value because they contain 
various types of qualitative information. These ratios not only include information on the 
frequency of transactions, but also the effects of zoning regulations, individual factors, traditional 
business practices, and other factors that may influence asset liquidation value. 
 Another contribution of this paper is its finding that the existence of large shareholders 
is an important factor in influencing the relationship between the debit and credit sides of the 
J-REIT balance sheet. Our results suggest that J-REIT managers can obtain funds by undertaking 
debt of long maturity when ownership is concentrated in a real estate parent company. The 
historical process of J-REIT market development may have influenced the importance placed on 
ownership concentration by a real estate firm. Market participants regard  these real estate firms 
as sponsors and even as real estate suppliers, even though there is no financial transaction between 
owners and REITs. 
 Our results also reveal that foreign investors who account for more than 70 percent of 
J-REIT market turnover in the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) do not influence the capital structure 
and debt maturity of J-REITs. We find that foreign investors prefer and purchase J-REITs with 
high asset liquidation values in the secondary market, but they do not determine the managerial 
issues of these J-REITs. This must be a consequence of the behavior of the foreign institutional 
investors. Foreign investors most likely feel that the profitability of J-REITs with high liquidation 
values is implicitly guaranteed by parent companies within the real estate industry, and that the 
creditworthiness of such J-REITs often exceeds that of the parent companies. For instance, foreign 
institutional investors compare the stock prices of Hankyu REIT, Inc. and its owner, Hankyu 
Realty Co. Ltd. We obtained information on the arbitrage activities of foreign investors from our 
interviews at Chuo-Mitsui Trust Corp, Ltd. on April 3, 2009. The results of the survey reveal that 
foreign owners do not intervene in the management of the REITs due to their focus on the 
secondary market. In summary, while the primary market of J-REITs is historically involved in the 
real estate industry and J-REIT blockholders influence internal management, foreigners transact in 
the secondary market and do not intervene in internal affairs. 
 Furthermore, the following conclusions can be drawn from our results. First, the 
continuing excessive concentration of J-REIT assets in the Tokyo real estate market also increases 
the asset liquidity of J-REIT balance sheets. These high levels of liquidity have encouraged 
potential participants to join the concentrated market. However, our study shows that the central 
part of the Tokyo metropolitan area does not always have the highest liquidity, because only a 
limited number of J-REIT with large assets can participate in the concentrated office building 
market. Despite this, asset liquidity in the Tokyo metropolitan area (excluding the 23 wards plius 
neighboring prefectures) is high, and concentration of investment in these areas influences the 
17 
 
liability structure of J-REITs. The existence of a blockholder is an important prerequisite for a linear 
relationship between a J-REIT’s asset liquidation value and its liability structure. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 This paper has drawn several conclusions from the results of its empirical analyses. Its 
main contribution is in finding a significant relationship between the new proxies for asset 
liquidation value and liability term structure. The newly employed proxies are the variables of 
regional characteristics and the usage of real estate property. Existing studies have selected various 
proxies for liquidation value, but we applied alternative variables to our calculations. Under the 
recent and excessive concentration of the real estate market in the Tokyo metropolitan area, the 
regional characteristics and usage type of a J-REIT’s real estate assets have become the most 
important factors in its liability structure. However, these factors are not the sole determinants of 
the liability structure; the J-REIT’s ownership structure can also facilitate its funding activities. 
Although few studies have covered liability term structure and ownership structure, we 
explored these factors in our research. We sampled J-REITs because it was impossible to obtain 
detailed data on the real estate assets of REITs in other countries. However, we expect that future 
research will reexamine the relationship between the regionality and usage of real estate assets and 
the debt term structure of REITs by using detailed real estate data from other countries. In addition, 
we focused on the REIT market in this study because REIT balance sheets show only one type of 
asset, that is, real estate investment assets. Manufacturing firms hold various types of assets 
because they invest in fixed assets, but we assume that the liquidation of these fixed assets could 
also influence their liability structure. In recent years, secondary markets have developed for 
commodities such as semiconductors, liquid crystal panels, and flash memory devices. Secondary 
markets for basic materials have also expanded dramatically. We expect future studies to attempt 
to treat the above assets as proxies for liquidation value and verify the relationships between these 
proxies and the liability and ownership structure of the corresponding firms. 
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Appendix 1: OLS Pooling Results for Regional Concentration as Liquidation Value 
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Note 1: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Note 2: Dum01—Dum07 are year dummy variables. 
 
Appendix 2: OLS Pooling Results for Short-term Debt and Ownership Concentration 
(a) Dep. Var. = LongDebt (b) Dep. Var. = LongDebt
Endogenous Variable
 DER -0.010 *** (-7.010) -0.009 *** (-6.420)
Instrument Variables
 Tokyo23 0.161 * (1.910)
 MetroArea 0.015 ** (2.100)
 LocalCity
 Ownership 0.095 ** (2.220) 0.080 * (1.830)
 Ownership*Tokyo23 0.140 (0.410)
 Ownership*MetroArea 0.311 *** (2.740)
 Ownership*LocalCity
 {Tokyo23}^2 0.144 (0.350)
 {MeroArea}^2 0.034 (0.710)
 {LocalCity}^2
 {Ownership}^2 -0.224 (-0.780) -0.241 (-0.990)
Dum04 0.076 (0.910) 0.044 (0.910)
Dum05 0.019 (0.790) 0.007 (0.640)
Dum06 0.028 (0.660) 0.057 (0.510)
Dum07 0.037 (0.780) 0.085 (0.480)
Const -0.097 (-1.310) -0.840 (-1.040)
F Statistic 4.090 *** 3.880 **
R2 0.039 0.044
Observations 119 119
(a)' Dep. Var.= DER (b)' Dep. Var.= DER
Endogenous Variable
 LongDebt -2.111 (-0.410) -2.111 (-0.410)
Instrument Variables
 ROA -0.774 *** (-5.450) -0.774 *** (-5.450)
 FirmSize 0.747 *** (3.440) 0.747 *** (3.440)
 MBR 1.119 *** (3.970) 1.119 *** (3.970)
Dum04 -0.004 (-0.050) -0.004 (-0.050)
Dum05 -0.019 (-0.370) -0.019 (-0.370)
Dum06 0.041 (0.610) 0.041 (0.610)
Dum07 0.029 (0.790) 0.029 (0.790)
Const 0.176 (0.490) 0.176 (0.490)
F Statistic 5.420 *** 5.420 ***
Hausman Specification Test 39.210 *** 39.210 ***
Observations 119 119
Firms 38 38
Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model
OLS Pooling Model OLS Pooling Model
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Appendix 3: Descriptive REIT Statistics 
 
(A) J-REITs 
(b) United States (e) Singapore
Endogenous Variable
 DER 0.097 *** (3.220) 0.419 *** (5.150)
 MBR -0.094 (-0.710) -0.552 (-1.140)
Instrument Variables
 Ownership -6.967 *** (-4.350) -1.261 *** (2.410)
 Ownership*MBR 0.061 (0.410) -0.223 (-0.410)
 Ownership^2 10.121 (0.910) -0.921 ** (-2.200)
 MBR^2 0.009 (1.410) 0.009 (0.150)
 Dum01 1.100 * (1.810) -0.210 (-0.140)
 Dum02 -1.011 * (-1.800) -0.187 (-0.950)
 Dum03 -1.170 (-1.440) -0.514 (-0.880)
 Dum04 -1.040 (-1.390) -0.185 (-0.470)
 Dum05 -0.740 (-1.170) -0.114 (-0.140)
 Dum06 -0.690 (-0.170) -0.212 (-0.140)
 Dum07 -0.100 (-0.410) -0.151 (-0.850)
 Const 7.140 * (1.910) 3.327 ** (2.120)
F Statistic 2.262 *** 3.755 ***
R-squared 0.041 0.074
Observations 923 42
(b)' United States (e)' Singapore
Endogenous Variable
 ShortDebt -0.085 (-0.420) 1.622 (0.610)
Instruments Variables
 ROA -0.127 *** (-3.220) 0.092 (0.590)
 FirmSize -0.072 (-0.140) 0.921 (0.990)
 MBR -0.355 (-0.410) -0.298 (-1.440)
 Dum01 1.222 *** (4.110) -0.170 (-0.510)
 Dum02 -0.415 (-0.840) -0.015 (-0.390)
 Dum03 -0.384 (-0.760) -0.240 (-0.210)
 Dum04 -0.377 (-0.840) -0.079 (-0.410)
 Dum05 -0.314 (-0.580) -0.041 (-0.310)
 Dum06 -0.225 (-0.410) 0.019 (0.200)
 Dum07 -0.110 (-0.170) 0.088 (0.760)
 Const 2.112 *** (3.420) 0.851 (1.310)
F Statistic 3.620 *** 2.260 ***
R-squared 0.032 0.024
Observations 923 42
OLS Pooling Model OLS Pooling Model
OLS Pooling Model OLS Pooling Model
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(B) REITs in major international markets 
 
DER: Total Liability divided by Market Value of Capital, LongDebt: Long-term Debt divided by Total Liability, 
ShortDebt: Short-term Debt divided by Total Liability, Concentration: Top Five Investment Asset Concentration 
divided by Total Investment Assets, Tokyo23: Real Estate Assets Owned in the 23 wards of Tokyo divided by 
Total Investment Assets, MetroArea: Real Estate Assets Owned in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area excluding the 
23 wards of Tokyo plus neighboring prefectures divided by Total Investment Assets, LocalCity: Real Estate 
Assets Owned in Local Cities other than those in Tokyo23 and MetroArea divided by Total Investment Assets, 
Residence: Real Estate Assets Used as Retail Residences divided by Total Investment Assets, Office: Real Estate 
Assets Used as Office Buildings divided by Total Investment Assets, Hotel: Real Estate Assets Used as Hotels 
divided by Total Investment Assets, Commerce: Real Estate Assets Used as Commercial Facilities divided by 
Total Investment Assets, Real Estate Firms: Ownership Ratio of the Top Real Estate Firm, Financial Institutions: 
Ownership Ratio of the Top Financial Institution, Foreigners: Ownership ratio of the Top Foreigner, ROA: 
Return on Total Assets, MBR: Total Liability plus Market Value of Capital divided by Book Value of Total 
Assets, FirmSize: Natural Logarithm of Total Assets. 
(A) Liability Structure (B) Proxies of Asset Liquidation Value
 (a) Concentration (b) Area (c) Use
DER LongDebt ShortDebt Concentration Tokyo23
MetroAre
a
LocalCity Residence
mean 1.089 0.575 0.239 0.474 0.523 0.064 0.215 0.316
s.d 1.477 0.246 0.192 0.233 0.282 0.140 0.239 0.474
max 13.608 0.992 0.955 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.976 1.000
min 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(C) Ownership Structure (D) Other Independent Variables
(c) Use
Office Hotel Commerce
Real Estate
Firms
Financial
Institutions
Foreigners ROA MBR FirmSize
mean 0.079 0.011 0.545 0.268 0.222 0.198 0.029 1.117 11.709
s.d 0.233 0.042 0.612 0.239 0.201 0.213 0.009 0.257 0.746
max 1.000 0.235 0.892 1.000 0.799 0.875 0.053 2.077 13.495
min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.449 9.676
ShortDebt MBR ROA FirmSize Ownership
(a) Japan (N=41) mean 0.239 1.117 0.029 11.709 0.474
s.d. 0.192 0.257 0.009 0.746 0.223
max 0.955 2.077 0.053 13.495 1.000
min 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.676 0.000
(b) United States (N=149) mean 0.340 2.152 0.011 6.683 0.319
s.d. 0.298 11.603 0.690 2.005 0.254
max 0.981 293.541 5.159 10.961 1.000
min 0.000 0.000 -20.494 -5.065 0.000
(c) Canada (N=18) mean 0.085 1.122 0.000 6.143 0.443
s.d. 0.112 0.547 0.117 2.025 0.349
max 0.841 4.194 0.190 10.139 1.000
min 0.000 0.000 -1.416 -1.752 0.000
(d) Australia (N=34) mean 0.145 1.029 0.026 6.228 0.412
s.d. 0.312 0.386 0.144 2.091 0.315
max 0.968 4.901 0.359 10.928 1.000
min 0.000 0.028 -1.907 -0.227 0.000
(e) Singapore (N=16) mean 0.165 0.921 0.056 6.791 0.684
s.d. 0.218 0.429 0.114 1.320 0.273
max 0.971 4.358 0.848 9.510 0.988
min 0.000 0.217 -0.444 1.630 0.000
